Chapter 1: The Concept of Free Will

During my time living near a quaint duck pond, I often found myself attempting to feed the ducks, hoping one would take a piece of bread from my hand. Typically, one would cautiously approach and snatch the morsel. This act by the duck can be contrasted with a similar experience at work, where a colleague would offer me a chocolate treat, which I would then accept.

Is there a fundamental difference between these two actions? Many people would argue that the duck's behavior is instinctual while my decision to take the chocolate stemmed from my free will. Despite my indulgences, I consciously chose to eat the chocolate. Philosophers assert that my action is considered free because I had the option to choose differently, perhaps opting to reduce my sugar intake. The duck, however, acts solely on instinct and lacks the capacity for free will. This distinction is often viewed as one of the defining traits that separate humans from most other animals.

The concept of free will is so deeply embedded in our understanding that it’s challenging to envision life without it. In philosophy, every notion is subject to scrutiny, including those that seem self-evident. Free will is one such notion, and questioning its existence raises profound implications.

Whether we genuinely possess free will hinges on how we define a free action. Two primary theories exist regarding this definition. The uncaused account posits that a free action is one that is not determined by any prior events. In contrast, the self-caused view suggests that an action is free if it originates from one's self, desires, or mental states. This perspective differs because it allows for the possibility that an action can be determined yet still be free, provided it aligns with one's internal motivations.

With these definitions in mind, let’s delve into determinism.

Chapter 2: Understanding Determinism

Determinism posits that free will is an illusion. To understand this perspective, consider the various factors influencing our actions.

Human nature and biology are significant influences. For instance, hunger is a basic instinct that drives behavior. If I don’t consume enough food, I will inevitably feel hunger, which prompts me to seek nourishment.

Additionally, our social environment shapes who we are. Each individual is molded by their surroundings, impacting our beliefs, preferences, and identities. Since we cannot select the environment into which we are born, its effects on us are largely beyond our control.

Psychological influences also play a crucial role. Take, for example, an individual who suffered a traumatic experience, such as nearly drowning, which may instill a lasting fear of water. This fear could persist into adulthood, unconsciously guiding their choices, such as avoiding water parks, even if they believe they are making those decisions freely.

As we consider the myriad influences on behavior, it becomes increasingly apparent that our actions may not be genuinely autonomous. The reality is that many of our decisions, along with our thoughts, could stem from factors beyond our control.

For instance, I enjoy ambient electronic music while working. My preference for this genre seems like a personal choice, yet countless influences have shaped this inclination. From childhood exposure to my father’s record collection, filled with classic rock, to nostalgic memories of the 1980s when synthesizers became popular, these factors collectively shape my tastes. Ultimately, my choice in music is influenced by many external elements, suggesting that my preferences might not be as free as they appear.

Philosopher Baron d’Holbach, in his work "The System of Nature," applies the scientific model of causality to human behavior. He argues that if everything in nature adheres to causal laws, then humans, being part of nature, must also be governed by these laws. Thus, if every action is a result of preceding causes, the notion of free will is called into question.

Here’s the determinist argument:

1. All events in the natural world are caused.
2. Humans are part of the natural world.
3. Therefore, all human actions are caused.
4. An action is considered free only if it is uncaused.
5. Hence, no human action is free.

While the argument is logically valid, its soundness depends on the truth of its premises. The first two premises seem accurate, given our scientific understanding. If we accept that all actions are caused and that a free action must be uncaused, we arrive at the conclusion of determinism.

However, is it genuinely the case that a free action must be uncaused? This assertion is contentious and may be the very point that could salvage the notion of free will. W. T. Stace addresses this issue by advocating for compatibilism.

Chapter 3: The Case for Compatibilism

Determinism has gained momentum in contemporary thought, aligning well with scientific perspectives on human behavior. If all actions can be traced back to neurochemical processes, the room for free will appears limited. Yet, while this view aligns with science, it clashes with our everyday experiences and practices. Stace critiques determinism based on this observation.

Stace notes a paradox: determinists assert the nonexistence of free will while behaving as if it does exist. For instance, we engage in two practices that inherently require a belief in free will: (1) making normative claims, and (2) holding one another morally accountable.

A normative claim arises when we suggest that someone should or should not perform an action. For instance, if I advise a friend against excessive gaming, my assertion implies that she has the freedom to choose otherwise. Suggesting alternative actions lacks meaning if the individual has no capacity for choice, akin to telling someone not to react to stepping on hot coals.

Stace argues that the act of providing normative reasons necessitates the assumption of free will. If normative claims exist, it implies that free will must, too.

The second practice, moral accountability, similarly suggests the necessity of free will. It becomes illogical to hold someone accountable for actions they could not have avoided. For example, if I accidentally step on your foot due to tripping, it wouldn’t be reasonable to blame me, as my action wasn’t within my control. If determinism holds true, all actions would mirror such accidents, making moral responsibility nonsensical.

Here's the structured argument:

1. If determinism is true, then free will does not exist.
2. To hold others accountable, free will must exist.
3. We can hold others accountable.
4. Therefore, free will exists.
5. Consequently, determinism is false.

This argument against determinism is compelling. The first premise is true by definition, and common sense supports the third. The second premise, however, remains debatable. Can we challenge it? That question is left for you to ponder!

Building on Stace's argument, I suggest that our practices of moral accountability and normative reasoning necessitate free will. A determinist might counter that these practices are akin to games we should abandon, as they require a belief in a falsehood—that we possess free will.

However, removing ourselves from the dynamics of accountability and normative reasoning is impractical. If this is indeed the case, the determinist exists in a contradictory state, believing in the absence of free will while simultaneously acting as though it exists.

Two critical issues arise from this response. First, the suggestion itself is a normative claim. If the determinist is correct, it becomes incoherent to propose such an idea. Second, these practices are fundamental to human interaction. If true, the determinist must navigate the contradiction of believing in non-existence of free will while participating in behaviors indicative of its presence.

Despite the strong pull of determinism from a scientific perspective, it also faces significant challenges. Believing in science compels us to acknowledge our place within nature, governed by causal laws. Yet, the sensation of possessing free will remains compelling. Without it, normative reasoning and accountability lose their meaning. How can we reconcile these conflicting views?

We must uphold two assertions:

1. All events are causally determined (the scientific perspective).
2. Free will exists.

Determinists argue that these two claims cannot coexist and favor the first due to its scientific validity. In contrast, Stace contends that they can coexist harmoniously, allowing us to accept both.

The determinist's error lies in assuming that a free action must be uncaused. Stace asserts that this definition is flawed. A careful examination of our everyday language use reveals that free actions can indeed be caused.

To illustrate, Stace presents two lists: one of actions perceived as free, and another of those seen as unfree. If our common understanding defines a free action by characteristics absent in unfree actions, then the determinist's claim that free actions must be uncaused does not hold true, as both lists comprise caused actions.

In the free actions list, Gandhi's fasting stems from his desire to fast, while stealing bread is driven by hunger. In the unfree actions list, actions are caused by external circumstances, such as threats. Stace's argument suggests that the distinction between free and unfree actions lies in the nature of their causes.

Upon examining the two lists, it becomes evident that free actions are caused by internal states, while unfree actions are influenced by external forces. Therefore, an action is deemed free if it arises from internal motivations, allowing for alternative choices. Conversely, an action lacks freedom if its cause is external and does not permit alternate outcomes.

Chapter 4: The Burden of Compatibilism

Stace's idea of free actions aligns with the notion of internal constraints. For instance, my desire for pizza represents an internal constraint, while a threat to compel me to act represents an external constraint. Stace's compatibilism asserts that free actions can coexist with internal constraints.

In summary, compatibilism reconciles the idea that all events are caused with the belief in free will by defining a free action as one influenced by internal states. However, this definition invites further scrutiny.

To evaluate Stace's view, consider whether there exist examples of actions caused by internal constraints that we would not categorize as free. Numerous instances arise. For example, consider an individual suffering from a psychiatric condition who covers their windows with aluminum foil due to a delusion. Although their action stems from an internal belief, it is driven by paranoia, rendering it unfree.

Moritz Schlick critiques Stace's compatibilism by highlighting that actions are not free when internal constraints arise from mental illness or neurosis. This assertion resonates; actions informed by irrational desires or delusions seem devoid of genuine freedom.

Schlick's observation prompts a reevaluation of Stace's definition of free action. We might revise it to state that a free action is one prompted by rational desires originating from our authentic selves. These desires reflect our true identities, making actions arising from them authentically ours.

Yet, this amended definition raises further questions. Are our rational desires genuinely within our control? Observing our desires reveals that they often arise spontaneously, suggesting that we do not fully govern them.

To support compatibilism, we must pinpoint an internal causal mechanism that allows an action to be genuinely attributed to the agent. This necessitates an exploration of self-causation, presenting a significant challenge for compatibilists.

Thus, the quest for reconciling free will and determinism remains an arduous endeavor, requiring a deeper understanding of the nature of human actions and the influences that shape them.